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and Skalaban's "The R-Squared" 
Gary King 
1. Introduction 
In  an  interesting and provocative article, Michael Lewis-Beck  and Andrew 
Skalaban make an important contribution by emphasizing several philosoph- 
ical issues in political methodology that have received too little attention from 
methodologists and quantitative researchers. These issues involve the role of 
systematic, and especially  stochastic, variation  in  statistical models.  After 
briefly  discussing  a few  points of  disagreement,  hoping to reduce them  to 
points of clarification, I turn to the philosophical issues. Examples with real 
data follow. 
2. Does RZ Contain New Information? 
Suppose we run a linear regression and obtain estimates of the effect parame- 
ter vector b,  the variance matrix Q(b),  and the variance of the disturbances $2. 
If  we  discard  the  original  data,  would  we  learn  something  new  about  a 
substantive research question by also knowing R2?  I argued in my 1986 article 
that the answer to this question is "no." 
To make this point somewhat more vivid, consider the following simple 
proof. First, let S(z) be the sample variance of some variable z: 
where n is the number of observations and i  is the sample mean of z.  The R*- 
My thanks goes to Neal Beck and Andrew Gelman for many helpful comments and to the 
National  Science Foundation for grant SES-89-09201. 
I. One frequently divides by n -  I  instead of n to produce an unbiased estimate, but I use n 
for simplicity. S(z) also happens to be the maximum likelihood  estimate. 186  Political Analysis 
statistic is then simply expressed as the ratio of the variance in the fitted values 
to the variance in the observed values, 
Now let us compare the information in this statistic to that in the estimator for 
the variance of the disturbances, 
and the variance matrix of the coefficients, 
In comparing equation 2 with equations 3 and 4, it should be obvious that 
R2, 82, and  V(b)  contain precisely  the  same  two  key  pieces of  statistical 
information-S(y)  and S(9). The distinction is only that R2  expresses them as 
a ratio,  62  expresses them  as  a difference, and  V(b)  expresses them  as  a 
difference, weighted by (XIX)-1.  Thus, no new information (and certainly no 
new substantive information) is added by knowing the value of the R2-statistic 
beyond  62.2 
3. How Should One Express the Information in R27 
We  take as given, then, that R2 and  62  (or v[b])  contain exactly the same 
variance information. If  we know one, we have little reason to determine the 
other. Nevertheless, we should still consider how best to express this informa- 
tion. While largely a matter of taste, the choice can be important in leading or 
misleading researchers conducting routine empirical analyses. In this section, 
I provide three important reasons to prefer the information expressed as the 
square root  of the  variance of  the disturbances-the  standard error of the 
regression, 6. 
First, Lewis-Beck and Skalaban prefer R2  because it is standardized to be 
2. Is R2 an estimate of a population parameter that is a part of  the underlying statistical 
model,  as suggested by  Lewis-Beck and Skalaban? To  answer this question, see equation  I  in 
their article, a perfectly good statement of a regression model. Note that they have no population 
parameter on that page (or any other) that corresponds to the sample R2.  In addition, they make no 
distributional assumptions when stating this model. Univariate Normality is helpful, if  appropri- 
ate, but  unnecessary nevertheless; multivariate normality, which they  mention later on, is not 
appropriate  and  would  not  be  helpful  even  in  the extremely unlikely  case  in  which  it  were 
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bounded between zero and one, whereas &is the same information in unstan- 
dardized form (only bounded below by zero). It is true that R2  always falls in 
the same range, but this range has different  meanings  for different research 
problems.  Furthermore, the unstandardized form is in precisely the units of 
the original dependent variable. One need not know any statistics to under- 
stand  that  Lewis-Beck  and  Skalaban's  predictions of  New  Jersey  mayoral 
elections are accurate to withih roughly plus or minus 7.7 percentage points 
(see Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, equation 6).  When reporting public opinion 
poll results, even Dan Rather now routinely gives the 95 percent confidence 
interval (popularly referred to as the "margin of error"). In contrast, the value 
of R2, 0.52, cannot be interpreted  in  the same language as one would nor- 
mally speak about New Jersey elections. 
For example, imagine advising the mayor of Newark during his reelec- 
tion campaign. If your model predicts that he will receive 53 percent of the 
vote,  plus or minus a margin  of  error of  1 percent,  you  should have  little 
trouble conveying this  information:  You  are convinced that he will win the 
election. However, if you were to give him your 53 percent vote prediction 
with an R2 value of 0.85 his first question would likely be: "What  does this 
have to do with the outcome of the election?" or "How sure are you of these 
results?'Indicating  to him that you have explained 85 percent of the variance 
is unlikely to clarify these matters. 
Second, we seem to learn again and again in many areas of statistics that 
standardization can cause trouble. For example, political methodologists now 
generally recognize that unstandardized regression coefficients should be used 
instead of  standardized coefficients.  (Indeed, this example is more than  an 
approximate analogy because a squared standardized regression coefficient is 
equal to R2 in the case of a single explanatory variable. Thus, any argument 
that applies to standardized and unstandardized coefficients should apply with 
equal weight  to standardized  and  unstandardized  variability.)  Standardized 
coefficients are not only farther from the substance of the research problem, 
but they cause serious problems when comparing results across different data 
sets. Indeed, this point was made persuasively over a decade ago in a widely 
read Sage green monograph written by Michael Lewis-Beck  (1980, 66):  "In 
general, when the variance in X diverges from one sample to the next, it is 
preferable to base any cross-sample comparisons of effect on the unstandar- 
dized partial slopes."  This should provide sufficient reason to prefer the un- 
standardized 6  to the standardized R2-statistic.3 
3. Obviously, if you use standardized coefficients or standardized variability and also report 
the sample variances  of your variables, you could reach appropriate inferences.  However, few 
methodologists  worry  about  the  reader or  analyst  who would  take  the  time  to make  such  a 
calculation. What we seek are ways of reporting statistical  results that minimize the possibilities 
for misunderstanding. 188  Political Analysis 
Finally, I turn to a more compelling philosophical reason to prefer 6.  We 
all agree that R2 is a fine measure when one is comparing different specifica- 
tions with the same dependent variable. Quite commonly, analysts gradually 
add explanatory  variables to their equation  and  use  increases in R2 as one 
piece of  information in  deciding  whether  the variable should remain  in  the 
equation; none of  us  have  any objection to this  procedure,  even  when  the 
comparison starts out with just the constant term in the regression and an R2 of 
zero. Measures of variability can also help to answer some important substan- 
tive questions, a topic to which I turn in  section 5. Our disagreement is over 
whether  R2 or any measure can  provide  a way  to judge  the  extent of  the 
discrepancies between  the current model and the true model. 
Let us imagine the best of all worlds. Suppose one had a way to calcu- 
late  the  probability  that  a  chosen  model  is  the  true  one,  given  the  data: 
Pr(model=truthldata). If this quantity, usually called an "inverse probability," 
were possible to calculate, we could easily use it to choose a model. We would 
merely  calculate  the  inverse  probability  for  many  models  and  choose the 
single model  with the highest probability  of being true. We  would then have 
(1) the single model with the highest probability of being true, given the data, 
and (2) a measure of  how  good the chosen  model  is.  When  comparing R2 
across equations, or evaluating a single R'  value and trying to determine how 
good the model is, people frequently treat this statistic as if it were an inverse 
probability.  They  sometimes  try  to increase  R2, thinking  that  a  higher R2 
means that you have a better model. Others use language and logic that seems 
to approximate inverse probability,  such as when Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 
ask  "How  good  is  [the model],  if  it  is  not  perfect?"  Similarly.  some re- 
searchers run a single regression and comment on how impressed they are that 
R2 takes on a given value. 
The goal of calculating an inverse probability  is a worthy one. Indeed, 
numerous  statisticians  have  made  it  their  life's  work  during  the  last  three 
centuries (see Stigler 1986). Unfortunately, scholars eventually realized that 
this goal was unreachable, even in theory. In the 1920s, R. A. Fisher first saw 
the impossibility of inverse probability and proposed a practical solution. He 
separated the two goals of inverse probability  and concluded that it was the 
second that was especially problematic: one could never provide a measure of 
how close a model approximates the true one. He then introduced the concept 
of  "likelihood"  as a way to choosk among different models for a given data 
9 
set. The idea was to choose the model that maximized the likelihood of having 
generated the data we observe. 
Thus, likelihood differs from inverse probability  in two important ways. 
First, nowhere in the definition of likelihood is "truth" mentioned, and there is 
no way to summarize how close one's model is to reality. Second, the concept 
of  likelihood  is  entirely  relative  to  one's  data.  Fisher  provided  a  way  of 
calculating the likelihood of various models having generated one's data and Stochastic Variation  189 
of choosing the single model that was most likely to have generated it. But all 
comparisons among the likelihoods of different models must be for a single, 
given data set. No absolute assessments of the model should or even could be 
made. As such, it is well known that one should never compare likelihood 
values across data sets (see Edwards  1972; King  1989). 
When using the methods of  likelihood,  this all becomes obvious since 
the likelihood function is an unknown function of the data. This makes stan- 
dardization for the purpose of comparing across data sets impossible: One can 
never turn a likelihood into an inverse probability. 
Indeed, my comparison here between R2, likelihood, and inverse proba- 
bility  is  more  than  an  analogy.  The likelihood in linear-Normal  regression 
models is a mathematical function of R2, or &(King 1989,85, n. 21). Because 
likelihoods provide no way to make an absolute assessment of how close a 
model is to reality, R2  cannot provide a way either. Perhaps because the scale 
of R2  is fixed from zero to one, it appears comparable across data sets, but 
this is simply not true. 
4. Over- and Underfitting 
The estimate 6  dominates R*  in virtually  every way, but if  one is careful to 
report  sample variances, and to interpret results properly, one could use R2 
without being misled. As noted above, it is a statistic based on precisely the 
same information as in  6. 
Suppose now that Lewis-Beck and Skalaban were to agree to dismiss the 
use of  R2 in cases where one seeks to measure the discrepancy between  a 
chosen model  and the true one, and when  comparing R2 across regressions 
based  on different dependent variables.  Nevertheless, R2 (or &)  still can be 
useful in comparing specifications for a single data set, a topic to which I now 
turn. 
To understand these issues, I distinguish two fundamental views of ran- 
dom ~ariation.~  These two perspectives  are extremes on a continuum. Al- 
though significant numbers of scholars can be found who are comfortable at 
the extremes, most political scientists fall somewhere between the two. (I  find 
that economists tend to be closer to perspective  1, whereas statisticians are 
closer to perspective 2.5) 
Perspective  1: Random variation exists in nature. Even if we measured 
all variables without error, collected a census of data, and included every 
conceivable  explanatory variable,  our regressions would  never  predict 
4. I  have  never  seen these  views clearly  delineated, but  the difference  among scholarly 
perspectives is quite pronounced. 
5. Perspective  I  is also very common in  the field of  engineering called "quality  control." 190  Political Analysis 
exactly. A researcher can divide the world into apparently systematic and 
apparently stochastic components, but nothing a researcher does to ana- 
lyze data can  have  any effect on reducing the fundamental  amount of 
stochastic variation existing in various parts of the empirical world. 
Perspective  2: Random  variation  is only that  portion of  the world for 
which  we  have no explanation.  The division between  systematic and 
stochastic  variation  is  imposed  by  the  analyst  and  depends on what 
explanatory variables are available and included in a regression analysis. 
Given the right explanatory variables, the world is entirely predictable. 
Consider now what these perspectives on stochastic variation have to say 
about  choosing regression  specifications.  Under  perspective  1, R2  has  an 
unknown optimal  value.  If R2 is below  this  optimum, the  specification  is 
defective because  relevant  explanatory  variables have  been  omitted:  some 
systematic variation has been incorrectly included in the stochastic component 
of the statistical model. If R2 is larger than the unknown optimum value, the 
specification is defective because of overfitting:  irrelevant explanatory vari- 
ables have been included and the regression merely maps the random error, 
making the model useless especially for out-of-sample predictions. The prob- 
lem is that R2 = .1 could be too high, and R2  = .9 could be too low; the 
researcher can never know. From this perspective, R2 is very important, but 
we have no way to use it to assess the model. 
Under perspective 2, R2  is a description of  the data. It says nothing of 
interest either  about  nature  or the  parameters  we  are estimating.  1 -  R2 
represents the variation to be accounted for by  the omitted variables, which 
we might now have the impetus to collect. The concept of overfitting is more 
difficult to deal with under perspective 2, and, indeed, some adherents take 
the extreme position that overfitting either is a meaningless concept or has no 
pernicious effect. This version of perspective 2 is problematic in that the very 
concept of inference can be overshadowed by  mere description of the data. 
How then do we decide on whether we are under- or overfitting or if we 
have a good specification, given a particular dependent variable? Much re- 
search has addressed this question, but I limit my discussion to four points 
that are particularly relevant to R2  and 6. 
First, one purpose of science is to explain many things with a few things. 
Given a dependent variable and an interesting set of hypotheses,  we should 
prefer to reduce stochastic variation in a model by using as few explanatory 
variables as possible. Even if one can justify  including 25 explanatory vari- 
ables on theoretical and empirical grounds in a regression, it will often make 
little sense to include them. The purpose is never to include all explanatory 
variables that seem important or even have significant t-statistics. 
Second, even if one had good reasons for including a large number of Stochastic Variation  191 
explanatory variables,  there is  usually  an efficiency loss  when we estimate 
additional parameters. Adding variables has a cost in terms of the precision of 
estimation of  the other parameters in  the equation,  and this  cost is not  ac- 
counted for in R2 (or even the adjusted R2 statistics). 
Third, we can sometimes learn what our stochastic variation should look 
like even before beginning data analyses. For example, the stochastic varia- 
tion produced by random sampling is easily calculable. In addition, we can 
often anticipate fairly accurately how much measurement error our dependent 
variable  contains, either from  intercoder  reliability  or simply  impressions 
obtained when doing coding. An intelligent analysis of these issues can make 
statistics like R2 or B much more useful. 
For example, the variation across surveys in the marginal percent answer- 
ing  "yes"  to  a  survey  question  is  the  total  of  (1)  measurement  error, 
(2) sampling error, and (3) true opinion change. This means that the total of 
measurement and sampling error must be less than or equal to the observed 
change.  If  we then  did  a regression analysis, and  & was smaller than our 
estimate of sampling plus measurement error, we know we are overfitting. If 
this comparison indicates that we might be underfitting, this has very interest- 
ing substantive implications. One could learn about either the nature of sto- 
chastic variability in this research problem (perspective 1) or the variation to 
be explained by omitted variables (perspective 2). 
One final, but very important, point about choosing a specification has 
arisen in the econometric forecasting literature. Perhaps the central lesson of 
this literature is that out-of-sample forecasts are much worse with overfitting 
than  with underfitting.  Models  with  fewer parameters,  and  thus lower R2- 
values,  usually  forecast  more  accurately.  This  provides  another  powerful 
reason  to consider a more  intelligent  approach  to understanding  stochastic 
variation. 
5. Examples 
I suspect that one of the lasting contributions of Lewis-Beck  and Skalaban's 
article will be their implicit attempt to expand the focus of empirical analyses: 
point estimates are important but by no means everything we wish to know 
about the world.  In the end, we seek to estimate entire probability distribu- 
tions, not merely means. The mean of a probability distribution is a point we 
can (and should) estimate, but it is not a lot more interesting than all the other 
points comprising the distribution. 
As an example, I took data from the 338 districts that  held  contested 
elections  for the  U.S.  House of  Representatives  in  both  1984 and  1986.(j 
6. These data are fully analyzed for various purposes in Gelman and King 1990 and King 
and Gelman  1991. 192  Political Analysis 
TABLE 1.  Regression Models, 1982-84 
Model  I  Model 2  Model 3 
Explanatory 
Variables  h  SE  h  SE  b  S E 
Constant  -.013  ,016  ,150  ,024  ,156  ,022 
VI  ,957  .028  ,636  ,045  ,618  .04I 
P  ,064  .007  -0 ,015 
I  .I 16  ,015 
Model  1 in table  1 presents the regression of the Democratic proportion of the 
two-party vote in  1984 (V,)  on the proportion  in  1982 (V,).  The regression 
line is plotted in figure 1. A large proportion of the districts fall within plus or 
minus 6  = 0.08 of the regression line, an obviously interesting number easily 
explainable to a nonstatistician  (0.08 is eight percent of the vote for congress). 
The R2  is .782, but this number is not of much use by itself. 
Figure  1  shows  that  the  stochastic  variability  exists  mainly  in  two 
clumps, one for Democratic and one for Republican  winners in  1982. (In a 
sense, this is just  a two-dimensional  "Mayhew  Histogram,"  where few dots 
appear near 0.5 on both axes due to the small number of marginal districts.) 
This pattern in the residuals is, of course, an omitted variable, which I call P 
and code as -  I  for Republican winners in  1982 and 1 for Democratic winners 
in  1982. Including this variable fits two regression lines with the same slope. 
The results for this specification  can  be  found  in  model  2 in  table  1; it  is 
portrayed  in  figure 2  (with a vertical  line added for clarity).  Note  that the 
variability around each of these lines is slightly smaller (&has declined from 
0.083 to 0.075 and, equivalently, R2  has increased  from  .782 to  .822) and 
more homoskedastic. 
The original purpose  in  analyzing these data was to study incumbency 
advantage, so 1 now include a variable for incumbency status (coded -  1 for 
Republican incumbents, 0 for open seats, and 1 for Democratic incumbents), 
and include it in this regression equation (see model 3, table 1). The standard 
error of the regression, &,  has again declined, and R2 has increased, slightly. 
These results are portrayed in figure 3. Note that dots represent congressional 
districts with  an  incumbent, and circles stand for open seats, in  1982. The 
dashed  lines  fit Democratic and Republican  open  seat races,  and the solid 
lines fit  the  Democratic and Republican  incumbent races.  The incumbency 
advantage is the coefficient on I in table  I  and is equal to the vertical differ- 
ence  between  the  dashed  and  solid  lines  in  figure  3, a  substantial  0.1 16 
fraction of the vote. Stochastic Variation  193 
Democratic Votes, 1982 
Fig. 1. Electoral swing in contested U.S. House districts 
In Gelman and King (1990), we settle on model 3 as the best specifica- 
tion. We  also believe that  it  provides the best estimate of  the incumbency 
advantage, which was the goal of our paper. However, note that all four lines 
are constrained to have the same slope. A natural question to ask is whether 
they  should be allowed to vary. We  will  undoubtedly  reduce the stochastic 
variation (increase the RZ) by doing so. At first glance, this seems like a good 
idea. Model 4 in table 2 includes the interactions necessary to let all the slopes 
vary.  R2  does increase, and  B declines,  slightly.  In  addition, an F-test  of 
whether the four extra coefficients are jointly different from zero is significant 
at the ,001 level. Furthermore, figure 4, which plots the results of this regres- 
sion, indicates that  model 4 seems to do quite a good job  of  reducing the 
apparent stochastic variability.  It  also admits a reasonable substantive inter- 
pretation: the less competitive a race is in 1982, the larger is the incumbency 
advantage (the vertical  distance between the dashed and solid lines). 
But should we include these variables? To  test to see whether we have 194  Political Analysis 
'.OO r 
Democratic Votes, 1982 
Fig. 2. Electoral swing in contested U.S. House districts with Republican 
and Democratic regression lines 
found a systematic effect, or whether we are just mapping random variability 
with explanatory variables, it pays to look at another random draw of the same 
election data. Of course, it  is not possible to run all the congressional elec- 
tions held in  1982 and  1984 over again, but it would be possible to conduct 
the same analysis for another pair of election years. The only disadvantage of 
this procedure  is the possibility that a fundamental change occurred in  the 
underlying electoral system. I chose the next pair of elections, 1986 and 1988, 
because of the small probability of  such a change. 
Figure 5 shows the results of model 4 fit to these new data. Note how the 
lines, especially the dashed lines, change dramatically from figure 4 to figure 
5. This seems to imply that model 4 overfit both set of data and the coeffi- 
cients on the explanatory variables do not seem to represent real systematic 
effects. To verify this hypothesis, figure 6 uses the new  data to fit model 3. 
Note how the lines in  figures 3 and 6 are almost identical. Even though the Sfochasfic  Variation  195 
Democratic Votes. 1982 
Fig. 3. Electoral swing in contested U.S.  House districts. Dots are incum- 
bents and circles are open seats, 1984. 
congressional district votes vary around these lines in slightly different ways 
in the two pairs of election years, model 3 is clearly picking up the systematic 
component of  these congressional elections data. Indeed, although I do not 
have the room to show it, the same sorts of patterns occur when applying these 
models to many other election years. 
Finally, it is worth studying the several types of variation in these analy- 
ses. With  all the election years from  1940 to the  present, the estimate of 
incumbency advantage by applying model 3 to each pair of years went from a 
modest .02 to a very substantial .12. In  general, we can always break down 
this total (or observed) variability by  an equation like the following: 
(Total Standard Deviation)'- = (Estimation Standard Deviation)'- 
+ (True Standard De~iation)~ TABLE 2.  Standard Regression Model, 
1982-84 
Explanatory 
Model  4 
Variables  b  SE 
Constant  ,549  ,094 
VI  -.I27  ,194 
P  ,080  ,094 
I  -.018  ,097 
IVI  ,079  ,199 
IP  -.413  ,097 
Pv~  -  ,066  .I94 
PIV,  ,780  ,199 
Democratic Votes, 1982 
Fig. 4. Electoral swing in contested U.S. House districts. Dots are incum- 
bents and circles are open seats,  1984. Separate slopes and intercepts. Stochastic Variation  197 
Democratic Votes, 1986 
Fig. 5. Electoral swing in contested U.S. House districts. Dots are incum- 
bents and circles are open seats,  1988. Separate slopes and intercepts. 
We  usually cannot estimate the true standard deviation directly, but it can be 
inferred by estimating the other two quantities.'  For example, the total stan- 
dard deviation in these estimates over the whole period is .043. In addition, 
the estimation standard deviation in the incumbency advantage coefficient (as 
measured by  the average standard error on the incumbency variable  across 
applications of model  3 to successive pairs of election years) is .012.8 This 
estimation variability means that we know the incumbency advantage fairly 
precisely, especially given its level in recent years (about .12). But this also 
7. The square of a standard deviation is a variance, required to make these quantities add. 
Nevertheless, the standard deviation (the square root of the variance) is more interesting because 
it is in  the units of the dependent variable-in  this case, proportions. 
8. To  fix these ideas, recall that the incumbency advantage estimate in  1982-84  was ,116 
with a standard error of  ,015; see the last column of table  1. 198  Political 'Analysis 
Democratic Votes, 1986 
Fig. 6. Electoral swing in contested US. House districts. Dots are incum- 
bents and circles are open seats, 1988. 
means that of the .043 observed (or total) variation, only a small portion is 
due to just stochastic variation, leaving the rest as systematic (or true) varia- 
tion in the unobserved incumbency advantage over the years. 
Note that nothing in our methodology constrains the total variance to be 
more than the estimation variance. However, since true variance can only be 
zero or positive, it only makes sense for total variance to be at least as large as 
the estimation variance. If it is not as large, you should question your statisti- 
cal model, computer program,  data, or logic of analysis. The advantage of 
concentrating on measures of variability like this is that we have a sense of 
just  how much unknown systematic (or true) variation in incumbency advan- 
tage exists. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that estimation error in the 
incumbency advantage (.012) is considerably less than the estimation error in 
the estimate of the average district-level vote proportions (b  = .069). 
We  can also go one step further by running a simple time-series regres- Stochastic Variation  199 
sion of incumbency advantage, calculated for each pair of years, on a linear- 
trend  variable  (the election  year).  The stochastic  variability  left  from this 
regression is B = .020, a considerable portion of the total variability of .043.9 
Thus, aside from the systematic linear increase over time in the incumbency 
advantage, we still have some remaining stochastic variability. We  could add 
additional variables to this regression to try to explain incumbency advantage 
over time,  but  we  would  not  wish  for our estimate 6 to  drop below  the 
standard error of  incumbency advantage of  .012,  for that would  be a clear 
indication of overfitting. It would make little sense to have a statistical model 
that purports to predict numbers more precisely than they can be measured. 
These are also very interesting numbers substantively,  of course, since they 
imply that further research might be conducted into the causes of variation in 
incumbency advantage over time or across incumbents. Although much  re- 
search has been conducted about the former, the latter is almost completely 
unstudied. 
All  these  calculations  could  be  made  in  terms  of  R2, but  it  is  more 
difficult and a lot less intuitive. Using R2 prevents the analyst from speaking 
directly about politics-in  this case, the Democratic proportion of the two- 
party vote and incumbency advantage-and  replaces it with an arbitrary scale 
from zero to one that has no obvious substantive interpretation. It could be 
done, and without harm if one is careful, but why do all the work if the end 
result is a less interpretable product? 
6. Concluding Remarks 
As Michael Lewis-Beck and Andrew Skalaban imply, close attention to issues 
of variability can be almost as important as estimates of the effect parameters. 
We owe them our thanks for opening up this area for discussion. We also owe 
these issues more serious consideration in our methodological work and em- 
pirical  research. 
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